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EXCHANGE CONSOLIDATION  
AND MODELS OF INTERNATIONAL 
SECURITIES REGULATION 
BO HARVEY* 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, globalization and a growing demand for capital 
have increased competition within the capital markets for the 
business of issuers and investors.1  This has led stock and derivatives 
exchanges to change their business models from mutual business 
entities, run for the benefit of their members, to demutualized 
corporations, run for the benefit of shareholders.2  Consequently, as 
for-profit corporations, exchanges have looked to position themselves 
more competitively in an internationalized securities market.  Part of 
such positioning has included increasing exchange alliances and 
acquisitions on a global scale.  This is highlighted by the recent 
merger between the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and 
Euronext (the new entity to be known as NYSE-Euronext).  With 
financial markets now spilling across national borders, demutualized 
exchanges see opportunities for growth and expansion by 
consolidating internationally. 
However, these changes have put securities regulators in the 
position of trying to stay ahead of the curve, as exchanges—often 
seen as once historic landmarks of national pride—push the limits on 
cross-border consolidations.  Traditionally, “[f]inancial exchanges 
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 1. See generally Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 
34-50700, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,256, 71,258 (Dec. 8, 2004); Irina Shirinyan, The Perspective of U.S. 
Securities Disclosure and the Process of Globalization, 2 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 515, 515-16 
(2000). 
 2. For an in-depth explanation of the exchange demutualization process, see generally 
Caroline Bradley, Demutualization of Financial Exchanges: Business as Usual?, 21 NW. J. INT’L 
L. & BUS. 657 (2001). 
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come with a lot of political, cultural, and emotional baggage.”3  Yet, 
the current activity of exchanges is challenging traditional models of 
securities regulation.  This note highlights the role demutualized 
exchanges are playing in the convergence of international securities 
regulation and evaluates the extent to which exchange consolidation 
fits within one traditional theoretical framework applied to 
international securities regulation.  In practice, cross-border exchange 
consolidation is largely shaping the path regulators are taking with 
respect to cross-border securities regulation.  However, securities 
regulation will always remain bound by national borders in certain 
important respects. 
Part I of this article will provide some background to exchange 
demutualization and explain the driving factors behind an increased 
competition among capital markets.  Part II will introduce the 
traditional theoretical models of international securities regulation.  It 
will focus on the idea of international “convergence” of regulatory 
standards and set forth examples of convergence (or the lack thereof) 
within, and between, the United States and the European Union.  
Part III will analyze how exchanges have recently influenced 
international regulatory coordination as illustrated by the merger 
between NYSE and Euronext. 
I.  DEMUTUALIZATION AND  
COMPETITION FOR CAPITAL MARKETS 
A. Brief History of Exchange Demutualization 
The first stock exchange demutualized in 1993.4  Prior to this, 
exchanges were run as mutual businesses.  Mutual businesses consist 
of private members rather than shareholders and are run by managers 
for the benefit of members, not for public profit.5  In demutualizing, 
exchanges take on the form of a “public corporation—the most 
efficient organizational form for large enterprises.”6  In doing so, 
exchanges seek the benefits of responding to competition, basing 
 
 3. Flying in Formation, ECONOMIST, Feb. 3, 2007, at 76-77. 
 4. See Shamshad Akhtar, Demutualization of Asian Stock Exchanges- Critical Issues and 
Challenges, in DEMUTUALIZATION OF STOCK EXCHANGES: PROBLEMS, SOLUTIONS AND CASE 
STUDIES 3, 5 (Shamshad Akhtar ed., 2002).  The first exchange to demutualize was the 
Stockholm Exchange.  Id. 
 5. Bradley, supra note 2, at 661. 
 6. Andreas M. Fleckner, Stock Exchanges at the Crossroads, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 
2542 (2006). 
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decision-making on shareholder value, pursuing new business 
strategies, unlocking members’ equity values, and facilitating business 
partnerships.7  Since 1993, over twenty-one stock exchanges have 
demutualized.8  This trend is not limited to stock exchanges; 
derivatives exchanges have also demutualized.9  By 2006, several 
major exchanges worldwide had demutualized or changed their 
business structure to allow for shareholders.  These exchanges 
include, among others, Euronext (itself the result of a consolidation 
of five exchanges in England, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and 
Portugal),10 NYSE, Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Chicago Board of 
Trade, London Stock Exchange, Tokyo Stock Exchange, Deutsche 
Boerse, Australian Stock Exchange, and Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange.11 
B. Factors Driving Exchange Demutualization and Competition 
Exchange demutualization, among other things, facilitates 
increasing competition within the “exchange business;” in other 
words, the business of providing a market where issuers can raise 
capital and investors can buy and sell securities.  In response to recent 
competition, alliances and consolidations have emerged as exchanges 
look to increase profitability.12  Generally, the forces driving 
demutualization are also those driving exchange consolidation, and 
fall into one of two broad categories: changes in the business and 
financial landscape and changes in the regulatory environment.  
 
 7. Bradley, supra note 2, at 668-69 (listing the Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s five major 
objectives for its demutualization). 
 8. Akhtar, supra note 4, at 5. 
 9. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 2, at 668-69; Akhtar, supra note 4, at 6 (listing derivatives 
markets that have formed alliances). 
 10. See Euronext, http://www.euronext.com/editorial/wide/editorial-1994-EN.html (last 
visited May 1, 2007). 
 11. Reena Aggarwal & Sandeep Dahiya, Demutualization and Public Offerings of 
Financial Exchanges, 18 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 96, 98 tbl.1 (Summer 2006), available at 
http://faculty.msb.edu/aggarwal/183final.aggarwal.pdf. 
 12. See Flying in Formation, supra note 3; Robert Daniel, NYSE, TASE Meet with Eye To 
More  Dual Listings, MARKETWATCH, Jan. 20, 2007, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/ 
story/nyse-tel-aviv-exchange-tout/story.aspx?guid=%7BB8906DED%2DEB14%2D4620%2D9 
72D%2D30C9C0DC72F4%7D; see generally David Weidner, NYSE Allies with Tokyo Stock 
Exchange, MARKETWATCH, Jan. 31, 2007, http://www.marketwatch.com/News/Story/nyse-
forms-working-alliance-tokyo/story.aspx?guid=%7BCBDCBE78-B20A-4CED-A3AD-E3C279 
77D302%7D (discussing the alliance between the NYSE and the Tokyo Stock exchange).  For 
an example of the intensity of the bidding war between exchanges, see Norma Cohen, Nasdaq in 
Last-Gasp Move to Win Bid, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2007, at 20 (discussing Nasdaq’s attempt to 
purchase a controlling stake in the London Stock Exchange). 
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These categories are not meant to be airtight independent causes; 
factors in one category may correlate with factors in another as, for 
example, regulatory changes produce changes in the financial 
landscape and vice versa. 
1. Changes in the Business Environment that Affect Exchanges.  
First, exchanges are reacting to the increasing technological 
capabilities of alternative trading systems (ATSs), also known as 
electronic communication networks (ECNs), which have put pressure 
on the traditional role of exchanges as an order-matching 
intermediary.  ECNs can match orders transparently, efficiently, and 
anonymously, and offer lower transaction costs for investors.13  ECNs 
have also lowered barriers of entry into the exchange business, as a 
physical trading floor becomes unnecessary.14  Thus, there has been 
downward pressure on profit margins resulting from order-matching, 
and exchanges are looking to diversify into other lines of business, 
such as clearing and settlement.15  Adding to this pressure has been an 
increase in the amount of order-flow large that brokerage houses are 
crossing internally (particular for institutional clients trading large 
blocks of shares), which obviates the need for sending orders to an 
exchange.16  Moreover, these technological innovations facilitate the 
trading of securities regardless of where the issuer is listed.17  “Today’s 
technology enables market participants to tap simultaneous and 
multiple sources of liquidity from remote locations,” so investors can 
obtain real-time information about securities trading on foreign 
exchanges, and execute orders on those markets electronically.18  
 
 13. See Akhtar, supra note 4, at 5-6; see also John G. Moon, The Dangerous Territoriality of 
American Securities Law: A Proposal for an Integrated Global Securities Market, 21 NW. J. INT’L 
L. & BUS. 131, 156-62 (2000) (detailing the specific trading advantages that ECNs have 
compared to physical trading floors). 
 14. Akhtar, supra note 4, at 7. 
 15. Battle of the Bourses, ECONOMIST, May 27, 2006, at 65-67. 
 16. Id.; Larry Tabb, Tabb Group, NYSE / Euronext: The Age of Global Exchange 
Consolidation Begins (2006), http://www.tabbgroup.com/thought/NYSE_EuroNext.pdf.  For 
example, POSIT, Liquidnet, and Pipeline are few computerize order-crossing systems that allow 
anonymous execution of large blocks of shares, which many institutional investors consider 
desirable.  See Nina Mehta, Internal Crossing, TRADERS MAG., June 2006; UBS Taps Dark 
Pools, SEC. INDUSTRY NEWS, Feb. 12, 2007. 
 17. See Moon, supra note 13, at 153-55. 
 18. Roberta Karmel, Will Convergence of Financial Disclosure Standards Change SEC 
Regulation of Foreign Issuers?, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 485, 519 (2000).  See also E-Trade to 
Handle Foreign Stocks, LATIMES.COM, Feb. 20, 2007, http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-
wrap20.1feb20,1,7505449.story?coll=la-headlines-business&ctrac (describing possibility of 
online trading of foreign equities). 
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Collapsing national and technological barriers have thus had the 
effect on stock exchanges that these lowered barriers would have on 
any other industry, increasing global competition for the listings of 
securities issuers and for the trading activity of investors buying and 
selling those securities. 
Second, the boom in financial innovation and derivatives trading 
has caused exchanges to look for ways to enter these markets.19  Able 
to offer investors access to a wide array of financial products,20 
exchanges can differentiate themselves in a competitive environment.  
NYSE-Euronext, for example, expects derivatives to be the biggest 
source of new revenue for the combined entity.21  Euronext traded 
forty percent of Europe’s $16 trillion in outstanding (notional) 
derivatives contracts,22 and represents a significant addition to the 
NYSE’s traditional strength in providing a liquid market for stocks. 
Third, in recent years the U.S. financial markets have not 
experienced the same increased growth in market value as certain 
foreign markets.23  In conjunction with a declining dollar over the last 
few years, this relatively slower growth than other international 
markets has prompted U.S. exchanges to expand into better-
performing and increasingly active international markets, either by 
forming alliances or through mergers.24 
2. Changes in the Regulatory Environment.  Recent regulatory 
changes have also increased competition among stock and derivatives 
exchanges.  Two important regulations passed by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) that are widely seen as enabling 
stronger competition are the Regulation of Exchanges and 
Alternative Trading Systems (Regulation ATS),25 and the recently 
 
 19. See Richard Beales, Equity Derivatives Tipped for Dramatic Growth, FT.COM, Apr. 10, 
2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/ecd19150-e790-11db-8098-000b5df10621.html. 
 20. See Richard Beales, Exchanges Try to Offer Instruments that Align with OTC Credit 
Derivatives, FT.COM, Mar. 22, 2007, http://cachef.ft.com/cms/s/0d95433e-d8a8-11db-a759-
000b5df10621.html (reporting on new exchange-traded instruments). 
 21. Aaron Luccheti and Peter A. McKay, NYSE Cranks up Derivatives Machine, WALL 
ST. J.,  June 6, 2006, at C1. 
 22. Telis Demos, What’s Driving the Stock Exchange Merger Binge?, FORTUNE, June 12, 
2006, at 32. 
 23. See, e.g., Tony Tassell, Europe Tops US in Stock Market Value, FT.COM, Apr. 2, 2007, 
http://search.ft.com/ftArticle?queryText=%22Europe+tops+US+in+Stock+market+value%22&
aje=true&id=070402010807. 
 24. See Battle of the Bourses, supra note 15, at 65-67. 
 25. Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release No. 
34-40760, 63 Fed. Reg. 70,844 (Dec. 22, 1998). 
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amended, controversial Regulation National Market System 
(Regulation NMS).26  Regulation ATS was adopted in 1998 in 
response to the growing number of ECNs, which were not 
“exchanges” in the traditional sense but were systems that “otherwise 
perform[ed] with respect to securities the functions commonly 
performed by a stock exchange.”27  The purpose of Regulation ATS 
was “to more effectively integrate the growing number of alternative 
trading systems into the national market system, accommodate the 
registration of proprietary alternative trading systems as exchanges, 
and provide an opportunity for registered exchanges to better 
compete with alternative trading systems.”28  Regulation ATS 
lowered entry barriers by allowing ECNs to compete directly with 
registered exchanges for the matching of orders.29 
Regulation NMS was adopted in 1975, in order to connect the 
various stock markets so that orders could be routed on a national 
scale.30  One express purpose of Regulation NMS is to allow for 
exchange competition.  Regulation NMS, recently amended in 2005, 
is “premised on promoting fair competition among individual 
markets, while at the same time ensuring all of these markets are 
linked together.”  It sets forth the objective of promoting “vigorous 
competition” among both individual markets and individual orders.31  
Together these regulations provide strong incentives for exchanges to 
reorganize as corporations, in order to partner or consolidate with 
emerging, demutualized competitors. 
The changing regulatory regime in Europe has also fostered 
competition and consolidation among exchanges in attempting to 
create an integrated pan-European capital market.  The European 
Commission has explicitly stated that “any remaining capital market 
fragmentation should be eliminated, thereby reducing the cost of 
capital raised on E.U. markets.”32  The Markets in Financial 
 
 26. Regulation National Market System, Exchange Act Release No. 34-51808, 70 Fed. Reg. 
37,496 (June 29, 2005). 
 27. Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release No. 
34-40760, 63 Fed. Reg. at 70,847 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 242.300(a)-(a)(1) (2005)). 
 28. Id. at 70,844. 
 29. See Fleckner, supra note 6, at 2566. 
 30. Id. at 2554. 
 31. Regulation National Market System, Exchange Act Release No. 34-51808, 70 Fed. Reg. 
at 37,498. 
 32. Roberta Karmel, The Case for a European Securities Commission, 38 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 9, 15 (1999). 
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Instruments Directive (MiFID),33 seen as trying to stimulate 
competition,34 rests on the notion that “market participants and 
investors [are] able to compare the prices that trading venues . . . are 
required to publish. To this end, it is recommended that Member 
States remove any obstacles which may prevent the consolidation at a 
European level of the relevant information and its publication.”35  
With these obstacles removed, several E.U. exchanges, such as 
Euronext, have consolidated, creating a liquid, efficient, 
interconnected financial infrastructure that has attracted issuers and 
investors, and challenged the traditional dominance of the U.S. 
capital markets.  More closely interlinked European financial markets 
have provided a viable alternative for international issuers as a source 
of capital. 
Moreover, the recent gap between standards in the United States 
and European regulatory environments, combined with the cross-
border, mobile nature of capital, have had a secondary (and perhaps 
unintentional) effect of intensifying the consolidation trend among 
exchanges.  The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002,36 
in response to a wave of corporate accounting scandals, enhanced 
accounting and disclosure requirements of publicly traded companies.  
Several commentators have suggested that the burdens of SOX 
compliance may have caused a decline of foreign issuers choosing to 
raise capital in the United States.37  For example, a report 
commissioned by New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg and 
Senator Charles Schumer notes that E.U. capital market revenues are 
growing by twenty percent per year, compared with seven percent in 
 
 33. Council Directive 2004/39/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1 (EC). 
 34. Tabb, supra note 16. 
 35. Council Directive 2004/39/EC, supra note 33, at 4. 
 36. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 7201-7266). 
 37. Robert G. DeLaMater, Speech, Recent Trends in SEC Regulation of Foreign Issuers: 
How the U.S. Regulatory Regime is Affecting the United States’ Historic Position as the World’s 
Principal Capital Market, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 109, 114-16 (2006); Hong Zhu & Ken Small, 
Has Sarbanes-Oxley Led to a Chilling in the U.S. Cross-Listing Market?, CPA J., Mar. 2007, 
available at http://www.nysscpa.org/printversions/cpaj/2007/307/p32.htm.  See also Jenny 
Anderson, New York Leaders Warn of Wall Street Decline, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 22, 2007, 
available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/01/22/business/wall.php (reporting on a McKinsey 
study commissioned by Mayor Michael Bloomberg of New York and Senator Charles Schumer 
of New York, addressing a “burdensome legal and regulatory environment” as one reason, 
among others, that the U.S. global financial services market could decline in light of European 
and Asian competition). 
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the United States.38  Also, the U.S. share of global initial public 
offerings (IPOs) has fallen from fifty-seven percent in 2001 to sixteen 
percent in 2006 while E.U. IPOs have increased from thirty-three 
percent to sixty-three percent during the same period.39  Some of this 
decline can be attributed to a period of deflation in the U.S. stock 
market value since 2000.  Yet, even controlling for this period of 
market value deflation, many foreign companies are choosing not to 
list in the United States, and are in fact de-listing from U.S. exchanges 
at an increasing rate relative to U.S.-based companies.40  These events 
have led some in Congress to re-evaluate the global competitiveness 
of U.S. capital markets.41  While the idea that foreign companies are 
prevented from listing on U.S. exchanges because of a strict U.S. 
regulatory regime is not new.42  SOX may have hastened American 
exchanges’ search for overseas markets as a way to diversify away 
from a single regulatory environment.43  In essence, for-profit 
exchanges are responding as corporations are intent on maximizing 
shareholder value by seeking to establish diverse sources of revenue 
and footholds in markets with growth opportunities.  Thus, the tighter 
standards of SOX may have been one factor contributing to the 
global exchange consolidation trend. 
 
 38. MCKINSEY & CO. AND NEW YORK CITY ECON. DEV. CORP., SUSTAINING NEW 
YORK’S AND THE US’ GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP, at 41, 44 (Jan. 23, 2007), 
available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/ny_report_final.pdf. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Zhu & Small, supra note 37, at 32.  Zhu and Small’s study focuses on the 2002-2005 
period. 
 41. See DeLaMater, supra note 37, at 118; China’s Strategy and Objectives in Global 
Capital Markets: Hearing Before the U.S. – China Economic and Security Review Comm., 109th 
Cong. 19-27 (2005) (testimony of Robert G. DeLaMater).  For example, several of the biggest 
IPOs in the last few years have been listed in Hong Kong or Shanghai.  See MCKINSEY & CO. 
AND NEW YORK CITY ECON. DEV. CORP., supra note 38. 
 42. See James L. Cochrane, Are U.S. Regulatory Requirements for Foreign Firms 
Appropriate?, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. S58 passim (1994) (arguing for easing access to U.S. 
capital markets for foreign issuers so as to maintain the “international stature of our financial 
markets.”). 
 43. See generally Demos, supra note 22, at 14 (positing that U.S. exchanges are searching 
overseas for new sources of revenue); MCKINSEY & CO. AND NEW YORK CITY ECON. DEV. 
CORP., supra note 38. 
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II. MODELS OF  
INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION 
A. Background 
Mobile capital and porous borders between national financial 
markets have highlighted the disparities between different regulatory 
models, enlivening an ongoing spirited debate that reevaluates the 
territorial conception of securities law.44  The traditional territorial-
based approach to securities law is being challenged by the 
globalization of finance.45  For example, U.S. securities law has a 
history of wrestling with the issue of determining the outer 
boundaries of its extra-territorial reach, as seen, for instance, in the 
exemptions the SEC carves out to accommodate foreign issuers, such 
as the attempt to restrict the territorial scope of registration 
requirements through the passage of Regulation S.46  Regulation S47 
provides safe harbors for issuers in response to the question of 
whether it is appropriate to require an issuer to register its securities 
under the Securities Act of 1933—even though there would be 
jurisdiction to do so—when it offers those securities exclusively to 
non-U.S. citizens in offshore transactions.48  Regulation S “declared 
the SEC’s explicit embrace of a territorial approach to Securities Act 
registration.”49  Like Regulation S, the reach of anti-fraud provisions 
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 193450 implicates a territorially-
focused inquiry, as reflected in the “conduct” and “effects” tests that 
the courts have developed to determine—sometimes not without 
difficulty—the proper subject-matter jurisdiction in securities fraud 
cases.51  With these territorially-focused inquiries firmly established,52 
 
 44. Frederick Tung, From Monopolists to Markets?: A Political Economy of Issuer Choice 
in International Securities Regulation, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1363, 1367 (2002). 
 45. Id. at 1369-71. 
 46. Kellye Y. Testy, Comity and Cooperation: Securities Regulation in a Global 
Marketplace, 45 ALA. L. REV. 927, 955 (1994). 
 47. 17 C.F.R. § 240.901 (2006). 
 48. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 242-43 (rev. 5th ed. 
2006). 
 49. Tung, supra note 44, at 1375. 
 50. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 
 51. See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206-08 (2d Cir. 1968), rev’d in part en 
banc, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968).  But see Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 988-89 
(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975) (limiting the scope of effects that can be 
successfully invoked); see also HAZEN, supra note 48, at 730-31 (describing the conduct and 
effects tests); James D. Cox, Choice of Law Rules for International Securities Transactions?, 66 
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unless regulators clarify and coordinate their oversight of securities 
markets, determining the outer boundaries of national securities law 
will only become more difficult as financial exchanges begin to 
operate through cross-border mergers and alliances. 
Due to the conflict between territorially-based law and 
borderless capital flows, various theoretical alternatives have been 
proposed to accommodate the decreasing importance of national 
borders in capital markets.  As a general matter, alternatives to 
conventional territorially-based regulation fall somewhere along a 
spectrum of models of international securities regulation, with the 
concept of harmonization at one end, and regulatory competition at 
the other.53  Some commentators have set forth finer, more detailed 
descriptions of the various possible approaches to international 
securities regulation,54 but for the purposes of this article, identifying 
the two conceptual poles in this debate, harmonization and 
competition, is sufficient.  As will be discussed, convergence 
(sometimes called “equivalence”) is a third approach that falls 
somewhere between the two extremes of harmonization and 
regulatory competition.55 
1. Harmonization.  Harmonization is defined as the idea that 
there should be a single, uniform, international regulatory standard.56  
Benefits of such a standard would be reduced transaction and 
administrative costs for issuers and investors, and thereby increased 
efficiency and liquidity.57  Reducing duplicative and even conflicting 
regulatory standards would lower the cost of capital, benefiting both 
 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1179, 1181-82 (1998) (stating that “the reach of the U.S. securities laws is 
territorial” and specifically that the conduct of the parties more frequently establishes 
territoriality). 
 52. See Cox, supra note 51, at 1181. 
 53. See Tzung-bor Wei, The Equivalence Approach to Securities Regulation, 27 NW. J. INT’L 
L. & BUS. 255, 255-56 (2007). 
 54. See generally Shirinyan, supra note 1, at 526-38; Hal S. Scott, An Overview of 
International Finance: Law and Regulation (Dec. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Scott, International 
Finance] (unpublished manuscript available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=800627). 
 55. Arguably convergence may be an apple in a bucket of oranges.  It is possible to argue 
that convergence is not easily comparable to harmonization and competition because it is, to a 
greater degree than the models of harmonization and competition, descriptive and grounded in 
the practicalities of the financial and regulatory environments; whereas the concepts of 
harmonization and competition are more prescriptive in nature. 
 56. Hal S. Scott, The Future Content of U.S. Securities Laws: Internationalization of 
Primary Public Securities Markets, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 78 (2000). 
 57. Wei, supra note 53, at 255-56. 
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investors and issuers.  Regulators themselves would also benefit by 
being able to allocate their investigative and auditing resources more 
efficiently.  Moreover, some argue for harmonization because 
“competitive regulation inevitably means more regulation,”58 as 
different jurisdictional standards lead to regulators from each 
jurisdiction jostling to exert authority over particular transactions or 
parties.  A national example of a harmonized system would be the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the United Kingdom, which 
replaced eighteen other U.K. regulators when it was formed under 
the Financial Services Act.59  The FSA acts as a “super-regulator,” 
overseeing the securities, commodities, insurance, and banking 
industries.60  At least one prominent scholar has noted that a unified 
regulatory arrangement is a “sound idea.”61 
However, there are several potential drawbacks to 
harmonization.  First, although it might promote efficiency, it does 
not guarantee that the most optimal regulatory standards will be 
implemented.62  Like a monopoly, a single regulator can be efficient 
but suboptimal.  Moreover, it may stifle regulatory innovation.63  
Having several competing regimes can provide a useful signaling 
device to regulators, as companies choose to issue securities where 
regulation is neither overly burdensome nor so light that investors 
require a higher return on their investments to compensate them for 
additional risk.64  This signaling function is entirely absent when 
issuers and investors have no choice but to adhere to a single set of 
standards.  Lastly, there are practical problems associated with 
actually implementing a harmonized regulatory system.  A 
completely harmonized system would require that states cede power, 
to some extent, to an international body.65  This is likely to be 
politically unacceptable, as “each nation would have to forswear its 
 
 58. Jerry W. Markham, Comparative Analysis of Consolidated and Functional Regulation: 
Super Regulator: A Comparative Analysis of Securities and Derivatives Regulation in the United 
States, United Kingdom, and Japan, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 319, 414 (2003) (arguing for 
competitive regulation within the American domestic setting). 
 59. See Financial Services Act, 1986, c. 60, § 8, (Eng.); Financial Services and Markets Act, 
2000, c. 8, § 2 (Eng.). 
 60. Markham, supra note 58, at 520. 
 61. Id. at 410. 
 62. Scott, supra note 56, at 78. 
 63. Id. at 80. 
 64. Wei, supra note 53, at 256. 
 65. Scott, supra note 54, at 16. 
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customary territorial jurisdictional activity.”66  This is unlikely, given 
the strong policy interests in maintaining at least some sovereign 
control over national securities regulation. 
2. Competition.  Regulatory competition is the idea that 
different regulatory standards should be encouraged as countries 
tailor laws to their specific circumstances.67  At its most extreme, this 
view—also known as issuer-choice—advocates that securities issuers 
should be allowed to choose their regulatory regimes.68  This is 
beneficial because, by giving participants in the financial markets the 
ability to choose among these standards, regulators would be subject 
to the discipline of the marketplace, resulting in a “race to the top.”  
The “best” regime—in terms of balancing costs with risks—would 
succeed.69  Contrary to initial impressions, advocates of this model 
argue that the competition would protect investors and provide a 
superior regulatory regime, just as competitive markets for products 
protect consumers from product exploitation.70  Issuers of securities 
that choose regulatory regimes that are overly lax would, in theory, 
be at a disadvantage in the marketplace, as investors would require a 
higher return on their securities, increasing these issuers’ cost of 
capital.71  Moreover, by choosing a regulatory regime with a higher 
standard of disclosure, issuers signal to investors the quality of their 
financial information.  Arguably, this is one reason why the United 
States has generally enjoyed a preeminent role as a place to raise 
capital, notwithstanding its complicated regulatory structure.  On an 
intra-national level, the United States is an example of a competitive 
model, where different regulators exert separate, and to some extent 
competing, oversight of the commodities, securities, banking, and 
insurance industries.72  While intra-national competition within the 
United States does not reflect the ability of an issuer to freely choose 
 
 66. Tung, supra note 44, at 1368. 
 67. Wei, supra note 53, at 256. 
 68. See Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 
2 THEORETICAL INQUIRY L. 387, 388-89 (2001) (discussing why issuers should be given a choice 
in disclosure levels). 
 69. See Shirinyan, supra note 1, at 535-36. 
 70. Romano, supra note 68, at 389, 393. 
 71. For a detailed study of the correlation between the quality of the regulatory regime and 
the cost of equity, see generally Venkat R. Eleswarapu & Kumar Venkataraman, The Impact of 
Legal and Political Institutions on Equity Trading Costs: A Cross-Country Analysis, 3 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 1081 (2006). 
 72. Markham, supra note 58, at 320-74. 
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their national regulatory environment, it does provide a theoretical 
contrast to certain European countries, such as the United Kingdom, 
that have a unified regulatory scheme. 
A criticism of the competitive model is that, insofar as 
competitive regulation leads to competing or overlapping standards, 
it increases costs to investors and issuers.73  In an age of financial 
conglomerates, this means a firm may be subject to oversight by 
several regulators, a number that only increases as the firm enters 
new national markets.  The recent decision by the NYSE and the 
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) to combine their 
regulatory functions was, at least in part, a response to member firms’ 
asserting that the overlapping jurisdiction of the two exchanges gave 
rise to inconsistencies and inefficiencies.74  Moreover, there is the 
question of whether competition will indeed lead to a “race to the 
top” rather than a “race to the bottom.”75  Insofar as investors do not 
have perfect information, they may be unable to appropriately price 
differences among regulatory regimes.76  Interestingly, the argument 
for full regulatory competition, like the argument for full 
harmonization, runs into practical difficulties with national 
sovereignty by requiring regulators to cede the decision of applicable 
law to the issuers of securities.77  The concept of competition also runs 
into the paradox that if it works as expected—the most “successful” 
regime attracting the activity of issuers and investors—it will in any 
event lead to some degree of convergence because unsuccessful 
regimes will seek to imitate successful ones in order to promote 
 
 73. See Scott, supra note 56, at 88-90. 
 74. Tomoeh Murakami Tse, NASD, NYSE Say They Will Merge Their Regulatory Bodies, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2006, at D03, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/11/28/AR2006112801696.html. Mary L. Schapiro, former NASD 
chairman and chief executive, and current CEO of the merged body, known as the Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), acknowledged as much by stating “duplicative and 
inconsistent regulation and overlapping jurisdiction will become a thing of the past.”  Id. 
 75. Shirinyan, supra note 1, at 537. 
 76. See James D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
1200, 1233-34 (1999); Scott, supra note 54, at 21.  Moreover, there is the interesting notion of 
regulatory arbitrage and exploiting this model when information asymmetries exist.  Do these 
disparities introduce possibility of regulatory arbitrage, or firms gaming the system in order to 
capture regulator cost savings?  For discussion of this possibility in a domestic setting, among 
the competing regulators in the United States, see generally Frank Partnoy, Financial 
Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211 (1997). 
 77. For example, for an exposition of how issuer-choice will simply not work due to a lack 
of “supply” rather than “demand,” because monopolistic regulators will not be willing to 
“supply” the market with competing regulatory choices, see Tung, supra note 44, at 1368. 
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capital formation.78  Thus, an environment of truly competitive 
regulation in fact creates some conditions that would also induce at 
lease some degree of convergence of regulatory standards, although it 
is unclear precisely how similar these standards would be. 
3. Convergence.  Convergence lies between the two theoretical 
poles of harmonization and competition.  Convergence does not 
imply securities laws should be identical, but neither does it mean 
there should be no coordination between various regulators in their 
lawmaking efforts.79  Convergence is sometimes referred to as 
“equivalence,”80 and is generally used in the sense that regulatory 
standards are roughly close enough to be functionally substitutable, 
such that the policy objectives of each nation are adequately 
fulfilled.81  One commentator has noted there may be fine distinctions 
between the ideas of “convergence” and “equivalence.” 82  However 
for the purposes of this article, “equivalence” and “convergence” are 
used interchangeably.83 
Because of the lack of political feasibility associated with 
implementing a purely harmonized or competitive model, one benefit 
of convergence is its eminent practicability.  It is highly unlikely that a 
regime of regulatory competition or harmonization would occur on 
an international scale.  This is because it requires agencies to cede 
sovereignty and public policy decisions to issuers or an international 
 
 78. A country’s capital base and its ability to attract capital play critical roles in the 
macroeconomic definition of per-capita income.  Thus, there is a strong incentive for countries 
to provide an environment conducive to capital formation. 
 79. See Wei, supra note 53, at 256 (using the term “equivalence” rather than 
“convergence”). 
 80. Charles McCreevy, European Comm’r for Internal Market and Services, Remarks at 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Comm’n Roundtable: On the Road Towards Convergence 
and Equivalence – State of Play in International Accounting (Mar. 6, 2007) (transcript available 
at http://www.eurunion.org/News/speeches/2007/070306cmcSECR.htm). 
 81. Wei, supra note 53, at 257-58. 
 82. Id. at 256-59.  In addition, some regulators may have competing understandings of the 
terms “equivalence” and “convergence,” however, these differences in understanding seem to 
be more the result of jurisdictional tensions between regulators in their attempts to define an 
appropriate measure of accommodation to foreign standards, and thus they do not want to 
appear to use a term that might only ambiguously convey the amount of accommodation they 
would agree to.  See id. at 260-61 (explaining the different understandings E.U. and U.S. 
regulators may have of these terms). 
 83. For detailed treatment of the finer degrees of different approaches, see Scott, supra 
note 54, at 15; Wei, supra note 53, at 260-62; Shirinyan, supra note 1, at 526-38. 
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body.84  To the extent that sovereignty still matters in a world where 
capital fluidly crosses national borders, convergence is powerful, as it 
recognizes that there are national policy interests in retaining an 
element of territorially-based securities law, while accommodating 
the needs of international capital markets.  Arguably, capital markets 
and regulators are in fact working toward some form of convergence.  
The goals of securities regulators are universal, yet the proposed best 
methods of achieving these goals differ from nation to nation.  For 
example, the twin aims of the SEC, protecting investors and 
promoting efficient capital formation,85 are also the aims of securities 
regulators worldwide.86  Yet, because of “differences in economic 
development, culture, legal and social environments, and the fact that 
different legal markets and their corresponding regimes develop at 
different rates of speed and over different periods of time . . . 
domestic rules will have to exist which will not be supplanted by the 
convergence process.”87  Thus, in contrast to harmonization and 
competition, convergence is better suited to balance the local with the 
global by considering the benefits of an international regulatory 
regime while accommodating important differences of economies, 
cultures, and legal environments. 
B. Examples of Convergence 
1. European Union Common Market.  The European Union is 
a helpful case study because it has had to address many of the specific 
issues related to convergence in its attempt to create an integrated 
capital market, and thus is “a model, an experimental laboratory, as 
to how regulation might be formulated and implemented in the 
 
 84. See Scott, supra note 54, at 16 (stating common rules require states subject to such rules 
to cede authority); Tung, supra note 44, at 1368 (claiming issuer choice is “politically 
implausible.”). 
 85. See generally Consideration of Promotion of Efficiency, Competition, and Capital 
Formation, Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2006).  See also LOUIS LOSS & JOEL 
SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS SEC. REG. 210 (4th ed. 2004). 
 86. International Organization of Securities Commissions, Objectives and Principles of 
Securities Regulation, at i (2003), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf 
(“[T]hree objectives of securities regulation . . . are: the protection of investors; [e]nsuring 
markets are fair, efficient, and transparent; [and t]he reduction of systematic risk.”).  The 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) is an international body 
comprised of securities regulators plus affiliate members that are stock exchanges, international 
organizations, and other similar entities.  See generally IOSCO, http://www.iosco.org/about/. 
 87. Shirinyan, supra note 1, at 516-17, 539. 
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international system at large.”88  Steps toward convergence worldwide 
have succeeded largely due to the efforts of E.U. regulators 
promoting convergence as an approach to dismantling legal barriers 
to integrated financial markets.89  European regulators have explicitly 
acknowledged the reduced cost of capital that is realized under 
converged standards, pointing to studies that indicate a benefit of 
approximately one percent of gross domestic product in the 
European Union alone.90 
The Treaty of Rome was implemented to remove restrictions on 
the free movement of goods, services, persons, and capital within the 
European Union.91  The E.U. initially attempted to fully harmonize its 
financial markets in the 1970s and 1980s, but noted it would require 
300 pieces of legislation to be enacted on an E.U.-wide basis.92  Thus, 
it shifted toward a policy that combined “home market regulation” 
with mutual-recognition; this meant member states agreed to certain 
minimum standards while tolerating non-essential differences, 
ultimately leaving the regulation of issuers to the “home market” 
(where the issuer was incorporated) rather than the “host market” 
(where the issuer was listed).93  This policy was predicated on the 
host-country’s recognition of the home-country’s rules as controlling 
the operations of cross-border transactions, and was facilitated by the 
reciprocity of mutual-recognition granted between nations.94  Such a 
policy required a degree of convergence, in that the home and host 
countries’ standards had to be roughly equivalent in order for each to 
feel its policies were being served in the other’s markets. 
The European Union initially designed a timetable for the 
targeted adoption of these securities laws standards which was 
implemented through the Single European Act amendments to the 
 
 88. Scott, supra note 54, at 8. 
 89. Wei, supra note 53, at 258. 
 90. Hearing before H. Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. (2004) (testimony of 
Alexander Schaub, Director-General, DG Internal Market of the European Commission), 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/general/2004-05-13-testimony_en.pdf. 
 91. Treaty Establishing the European Community (Treaty of Rome), Mar. 25, 1957, 2006 
O.J. (C 321) 1. 
 92. Scott, supra note 54, at 15.  See generally Completing the Internal Market: White Paper 
from the Commission to the European Council, COM (1985) 310 final (June 14, 1985), available 
at http://aei.pitt.edu/1113/01/internal_market_wp_COM_85_310.pdf (outlining the steps 
necessary for achieving an integrated internal market for a European Community). 
 93. Scott, supra note 54, at 27. 
 94. Id. at 27-28. 
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Treaty of Rome.95  These amendments encourage the use of 
Directives to achieve a common market.96  Directives originate with 
the European Commission (E.C.) and are not self-executing.97  The 
Directives are binding on E.U. member states as each member state 
has a duty to implement the aims of the Directive; however, 
Directives allow member states to choose the appropriate method of 
achieving the Directive’s final objectives. 98  In the European Union’s 
attempt to establish a functioning common market, the E.C. has 
generally favored the use of Directives to achieve harmonization of 
laws.99  The “implementation of these Directives is coordinated 
through E.U.-wide functional regulators” composed of individuals 
from member states, “such as the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators (CESR).”100 
These Directives are largely responsible for the increased 
convergence of capital markets in Europe.  Moreover, through the 
process of integrating fifteen different national securities regimes, 
E.U. regulators have developed a model of converged standards 
while leaving enforcement of territorially-based issues to national 
regulators.  It is beneficial to look at three Directives promulgated to 
unify capital markets within Europe: the Transparency Directive, the 
Prospectus Directive and the Fifth Directive on Company Law. 
a. Transparency Directive.  The Transparency Directive101 
established requirements concerning the periodic disclosure of 
information, including the annual financial report.102  A significant 
change made by the Directive, as it was amended in 2004, was the 
adoption of the requirement that issuers across the European Union 
complete reports, using the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) by 2005.103  This was significant because it 
 
 95. Karmel, supra note 32, at 12.  For a detailed treatment of the background of the Single 
European Act and its basis in the, see also P.J.G. KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 33-35, 132-34 (3d. ed. 1998). 
 96. Karmel, supra note 32, at 13. 
 97. Roberta S. Karmel, Reform of Public Company Disclosure in Europe, 26 U. PA. J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 379, 383 (2005). 
 98. See, e.g., K.P.E. LASOK AND D. LASOK, LAW & INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 142 (7th ed. 2001). 
 99. KAPTEYN & VAN THEMAAT, supra note 95, at 779. 
 100. Scott, supra note 54, at 8. 
 101. Council Directive 2004/109, 2004 O.J. (L 390) 38 (EC); Council Regulation 1606/2002, 
The Application of International Accounting Standards, art. 4, 2002 O.J. (L 243) 1 (EC). 
 102. Karmel, supra note 94, at 394-95. 
 103. Council Regulation 1606/2002, supra note 101, at 2. 
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introduced the issue of whether non-E.U. issuers—particularly U.S. 
issuers that reported in U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (U.S. GAAP)—would also be required to report in IFRS.104  
Initially member states were given the option of allowing U.S. issuers 
to defer adoption of IFRS until 2007,105 but this has been changed 
recently to 2009.106  This amendment allows standard setters and 
regulators in each country to continue engaging in dialogue and 
working through the convergence process until that time.107 
b. Prospectus Directive.  Another important Directive that has 
facilitated capital market integration has been the Prospectus 
Directive.108  The Prospectus Directive establishes a set of uniform 
requirements throughout the European Union concerning the 
comprehensive disclosure of information upon an issuer’s securities 
offering.109  It was intended to play a central role in integrating the 
market for financial services in the European Union.110  Under the 
Directive, the regulators in the home state for each issuer process the 
issuer’s disclosure documents, and, once approved, securities 
regulators in other E.U. member states cannot impose additional 
disclosure requirements.111  Interestingly, the Prospectus Directive 
does not provide for civil liability, unlike the Securities Act of 1933; 
these matters are left to the host states.112  This is an important issue 
from an enforcement and remedy standpoint, and is one this note will 
return to later. 
c. Proposal for a Fifth Directive on Company Law.  A Directive 
that was intended to facilitate convergence, but was highly 
 
 104. Karmel, supra note 97, at 394-95. 
 105. Stuart H. Deming, International Accounting Standards, 40 INT’L LAW. 363, 364 (2006). 
 106. McCreevy, supra note 80. 
 107. Comm. of Eur. Sec. Reg., Technical Report, CESR’s advice to the EC on the Work 
Programmes of the Canadian, Japanese, and US Standard Setters, the Definition of Equivalence 
and a List of Third Country GAAPs Currently Used on the E.U. Capital Markets, sec. II.8 (Mar. 
8, 2007), available at  http://www.cesr-eu.org/index.php?page=groups&mac=0&id=46 
[hereinafter Technical Report]. 
 108. Council Directive 2003/71, 2003 O.J. (L 354) 64 (EC). 
 109. Karmel, supra note 97, at 388. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 392.  See also Council Directive 2003/71, supra note 108, at 65 (identifying the 
home member state as “the one best placed to regulate the issuer for the purposes of this 
Directive”); id. at 70 (defining “home member state” and “host member state”); id. at 78 
(describing relationship between host and home member states in light of prospectus being 
approved by the home member state). 
 112. Karmel, supra note 97, at 392-93, 398; Scott, supra note 56, at 82. 
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controversial, was the Proposal for a Fifth Directive.113  This Directive 
revealed sharp differences between E.U. member states, particularly 
the United Kingdom and Germany, over certain aspects of corporate 
law, and is thus instructive as to those areas of law where convergence 
may be difficult to achieve.  The Fifth Directive, also known as the 
Company Structure Directive,114 was amended and re-proposed three 
times yet was never adopted.115  All of the Proposals for a Fifth 
Directive concerned corporate organizational structure, employee 
participation, rights and duties of the board, and shareholders’ 
rights.116  The Fifth Directive provoked disagreement in part because 
it touched upon fundamental differences concerning the significant 
role of shareholders’ equity capital in the United Kingdom, in 
contrast “to the role of bank credit or government . . . funding on the 
Continent.”117  The Directive also highlighted significant differences 
between E.U. member states concerning the structure of the board, in 
particular the differences between one- and two-tier boards.118  In fact 
the first proposed Directive mandated a two-tier board.119  However, 
this revealed sharp differences between the U.K. model, which 
generally favors a one-tier board that can be amended through the 
articles, and the German model, which mandates a two-tier board 
separating the functions of supervision and management.120  The 
German model gives stakeholders other than shareholders—the main 
group being employees—the possibility of influencing the company 
through the supervisory board.121  Moreover, the Directive highlighted 
that the influence of shareholders wield through a shareholders’ 
meeting is quite different from country to country.  In the United 
Kingdom and France, the shareholders’ meeting is seen as “the 
supreme organ” for shareholders, especially if it appoints managers 
directly; by contrast, in Germany the shareholders’ meeting is seen 
“at most as being on an equal footing” with the exercise of the powers 
of other constituencies, such as employees and directors, and is 
 
 113. Amended Proposal for Fifth Directive, 1983 O.J. (C 240) 2 (EC). 
 114. See STEFAN GRUNDMANN, EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW: ORGANIZATION, FINANCE 
AND CAPITAL MARKETS 219 (2007). 
 115. See id. at 62, 65 fig.4a, 66, 219. 
 116. Id. at 62, 219. 
 117. Karmel, supra note 32, at 18. 
 118. See GRUNDMANN, supra note 114, at 219. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 225. 
 121. See id. at 225-31. 
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restrictive in regard to the actual powers that can be exercised at the 
meeting.122 
The Transparency and Prospectus Directives have facilitated 
common standards within the European Union; however, they were 
supported by a common political infrastructure, which is lacking on 
an international scale between the E.U. and other countries.  
Regardless, the content of these Directives provides insight into what 
areas of law may see more convergence than others.123  For instance, 
the Proposed Fifth Directive sparked significant controversy because 
it prescribed rules governing significant cultural and economic biases 
reflected in features such as the basic structure of corporate 
governance (one- versus two-tier boards), the administrative rights of 
shareholders (such as powers exercised at the shareholders’ meeting), 
and the role of stakeholders such as employees; accordingly, it is 
unlikely that these areas—more broadly, areas affecting internal 
company structure and governance—will be subject to a globally 
converged set of standards.124  Additionally, as the Prospectus 
Directive leaves civil liability determination to host states, it is likely 
that questions of liability and appropriate remedies may be left to 
each individual nation to determine.  By contrast, questions of 
disclosure and accounting standards are more easily resolved via 
converged standards, because they do not touch upon culturally and 
politically sensitive corporate governance relationships between 
management, directors, shareholders, and auditors, and the relative 
rights and duties of each group. 
It is also notable that E.U. member states do not apply securities 
laws to their own investors extra-territorially, as does the United 
States.125  This fundamental difference between the European Union 
and United States may mean that convergence on an international 
 
 122. Id. at 241. 
 123. See discussion infra Part III. 
 124. In some ways a European fear of America “exporting” SOX also reflects these core 
disagreements, because it was seen as an attempt to mandate an American style of corporate 
governance, in contrast to the very different relationships between auditors, shareholders, 
management, and directors that exist in Europe and elsewhere in the world.  For example, prior 
to the passage of SOX, the E.U. sent Senator Sarbanes a letter urging for accommodations for 
foreign accounting firms. Congress Acts: A Tough Corporate-Reform Bill Sails Through, 
ECONOMIST, July 27, 2002, at 62.  For an explanation of the differences between corporate 
governance law in Germany and the United States, see Jonathan Shirley, International Law and 
the Ramifications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 27 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 501, 511-13 
(2004). 
 125. Scott, supra note 56, at 83. 
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scale would need to overcome the significant history of extra-
territorial application of U.S. securities laws.  The following section 
sketches out the relatively recent history of convergence as it has 
played out between the European Union and United States, focusing 
particularly on the possible convergence of accounting standards. 
2. Trans-Atlantic Convergence.  There has been a long history 
of cooperation between securities regulators in the United States and 
elsewhere.  For example, the SEC has entered into a number of 
bilateral Memoranda of Understanding in the areas of insider trading 
and enforcement.126  The SEC also has a long history of balancing the 
protection of investors with the facilitation of efficient capital 
markets.127  Aiding the formation of efficient capital markets and 
allowing U.S. investors to access the securities of foreign companies 
encourages the accommodation of foreign issuers, so that they list on 
U.S. exchanges and are subject to the SEC disclosure system, while 
not being so accommodating that U.S. issuers (or investors) are at a 
disadvantage.128  Historically, the SEC has walked this line by carving 
out specific exemptions for foreign issuers.  For example, Regulation 
S was intended to provide a clear safe harbor from registration for 
foreign private issuers.129  It operated “as a safety valve, relieving the 
SEC of pressure exerted by foreign issuers . . . U.S. investment banks 
[and others].”130  Likewise, one of the goals of Rule 144A,131 governing 
the private placement of securities, was to increase foreign investment 
in the U.S. economy.132  Recently, the SEC has tried to accommodate 
foreign issuers with respect to SOX, as the Commission recognizes 
the importance of keeping the United States attractive to those 
wishing to raise capital, and the European Union was concerned with 
the foreign impact of SOX.133  The SEC has also entered into 
regulatory dialogue with the European Union, including supporting 
meetings with the Commission of European Securities Regulators, a 
 
 126. Scott, supra note 54, at 11. 
 127. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2006). 
 128. Roberta S. Karmel, The Securities and Exchange Commission Goes Abroad to Regulate 
Corporate Governance, 33 STETSON L. REV. 849, 862-63 (2004). 
 129. See Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.902-230.904 (2006). 
 130. Karmel, supra note 32, at 512. 
 131. Rule 144A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2006). 
 132. Shirinyan, supra note 1, at 521. 
 133. Scott, supra note 54, at 12. 
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technical regulator, on several issues that may result in greater 
convergence of regulator standards between the two.134 
One area of particular and recent interest has been the possibility 
of convergence in U.S. GAAP and IFRS accounting standards.  
National accounting standards are a cornerstone of a country’s 
financial system, providing an essential means of disclosing critical 
information for the valuation and comparison of companies.135  Thus, 
streamlining accounting standards is an essential first step before 
considering a more general convergence of securities laws.  Some 
degree of convergence in accounting standards has taken on renewed 
importance now that the European Union operates under the single 
standard of the IFRS.  For instance, IFRS is increasingly being used 
outside the European Union: Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and the Philippines have all adopted IFRS.136  Canada and 
China have announced they will be moving their standards toward 
IFRS in coming years.137  Meanwhile, U.S. issuers still use a separate 
standard, U.S. GAAP. 
U.S. GAAP standards are set by a private body, the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB).138  IFRS grew out of an effort 
by another private body, the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB).139  These two private bodies have worked together 
since 2002, when they signed the Norwalk Agreement, in which they 
committed to the development of high-quality compatible accounting 
standards that could be used in cross-border financial reporting.140  
These were private efforts, given the IASB and FASB’s status as 
 
 134. Id.  For a list of SEC’s dialogues and international efforts, see Securities and Exchange 
Commission, International Organizations, http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_intlorg.htm 
(last visited Jan. 22, 2008). 
 135. Shirinyan, supra note 1, at 550; see also Hal S. Scott, Nomura Professor and Dir. of 
Program on Int’l Fin. Sys., Harvard Law Sch., Remarks at International Financial Reporting 
Standards Roadmap Roundtable 3 (Mar. 6, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
spotlight/ifrsroadmap/ifrsroadmap-transcript.txt) (“Accounting standards may be arcane to 
some, but they are the bedrock of the financial system, and, ultimately, of the economy as a 
whole.”). 
 136. Deming, supra note 105, at 365. 
 137. Id. at 366.  See also Cultural Revolution, ECONOMIST, Jan. 13, 2007, at 63-64 (describing 
the significance of China’s move to IFRS). 
 138. See FASB, Facts About FASB 1, available at http://www.fasb.org/facts/facts_about_ 
fasb.pdf. 
 139. Deming, supra note 105, at 363. 
 140. Fin’l Accounting Standards Bd. & Int’l Accounting Standards Bd., Memorandum of 
Understanding (The Norwalk Agreement) (Sept. 18, 2002), available at http://www.fasb.org/ 
news/memorandum.pdf. 
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private bodies.  The U.S. government became involved after the 
passage of SOX,  when Congress mandated that the SEC examine the 
possibility of changing the nature of the U.S. accounting system from 
a “rules-based” approach (which describes the U.S. GAAP approach) 
to a “principles-based” approach (which describes the IFRS 
approach).141  Further, in 2005, the chief accountant of the SEC 
published an article that laid out a “roadmap to elimination of the 
SEC’s requirement that foreign private issuers reconcile financial 
statements prepared under IFRSs to U.S. GAAP.”142  It 
acknowledged the increasing use of IFRS, stating the “[p]rimary 
driver behind the expanded use of IFRSs is a decision made by the 
European Parliament and the Council of the European Union  that 
all listed European Union companies . . . must prepare their 
consolidated financial statements in accordance with IFRSs from 2005 
onward.”143  The article and its roadmap were formally endorsed by 
the SEC just a few months after its publication.144 
On the European side, the European Union, in both the 
Transparency and Prospectus Directives required that the European 
Commission establish whether non-E.U. accounting standards, 
including U.S. GAAP, were equivalent to IFRS.145  As part of this 
process, the European Commission directed the Commission of 
European Securities Regulators (CESR) to determine whether these 
standards are equivalent and to advise whether non-E.U. issuers 
should continue to be allowed to use their respective accounting 
principles, instead of IFRS.  The study recommended, first, that 
issuers be allowed to use U.S., Canadian, and Japanese GAAP until 
2009.  In 2009, the CESR’s decision determining equivalence is set to 
be announced, after which use of non-E.U. accounting standards will 
be allowed only if they are determined to be equivalent to IFRS.146 
These efforts are laudable.  A determination that U.S. GAAP 
and IFRS were equivalent would be a significant step toward 
convergence.  Additionally, there have been some steps toward 
 
 141. Christopher Cox, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Comm., Remarks at 
International Financial Reporting Standards Roadmap Roundtable (Mar. 6, 2007) (transcript 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch030607cc.htm). 
 142. Donald T. Nicolaisen, A Securities Regulator Looks at Convergence, 25 NW. J. INT’L L. 
& BUS. 661, 662 (2005). 
 143. Id. at 661-62. 
 144. See Cox, supra note 141. 
 145. See Technical Report, supra note 107, sec. II.8. 
 146. Id. sec. II.9. 
03__HARVEY.DOC 5/27/2008  1:28:26 PM 
174 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 18:151 
international convergence with respect to disclosure standards where 
there are few national differences and rules are generally consistent 
with U.S. law.147  The European Prospectus Directive, for example, 
adopts disclosure requirements that are generally the same as those in 
the United States.148  However, full harmonization on all aspects of 
securities law is both unlikely and undesirable.  For instance, the 
trans-Atlantic dialogue over accounting standards, as well as the 
European Union’s experience creating an integrated regulatory 
scheme, highlights particular areas where convergence is relatively 
easier to achieve, as opposed to areas such as enforcement.  
“Standardized enforcement would require countries to have similar 
enforcement remedies, both administrative and private. . . . [A] 
significant number of foreign issuers have reportedly avoided U.S. 
public markets because of the stiff enforcement remedies employed 
by the SEC—including potential criminal liability—and the prospect 
of costly private class action suits. . . .”149  For example, the Prospectus 
Directive does not provide for civil liability, and illustrates how 
enforcement and remedies available to investors will likely remain 
territorially-based.  Indeed, even in the highly unified European 
Union, responsibility for enforcement is left up to host country 
regulators.150 
Moreover, there are significant differences in the type of 
investors in the European Union versus in the United States. 
In the U.S., 50% of investors are retail, whereas in Europe, the 
number of retail investors is quite small.  Further, securities in 
Europe are overwhelmingly debt instruments, in contrast to the 
equity instruments being the dominant security in the U.S.  
Consequently, investor protection means different things to 
Americans and Europeans.151 
Likewise, as seen from SOX and the Fifth Company Directive, any 
attempt to harmonize laws related to corporate governance will face 
stiff resistance because it implicates culturally and socially informed 
norms about the corporate power relationships between shareholders, 
managers, owners, and auditors.  These differences reveal that for 
 
 147. Scott, supra note 56, at 78-79. 
 148. Scott, supra note 54, at 17. 
 149. Scott, supra note 56, at 78-79. 
 150. Karmel, supra note 97, at 392; Scott, supra note 56, at 82; see discussion supra Part 
II.B.1.b. 
 151. Roel C. Campos, Comm’r, Sec. and Exc. Comm., Speech at the U.S.-Europe 
Symposium Program on International Financial Systems: Convergence and Beyond (Nov. 13, 
2003). 
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particular public policy interests, regulators have an incentive to 
remain territorially-focused in their approach, so as to protect those 
distinctive financial market characteristics or political aims that are 
not shared by other nations.  There are limits to convergence, and by 
acknowledging these limits regulators are able to focus their efforts 
more productively on those areas where coordinated, roughly 
equivalent, and high-quality standard-setting is more likely. 
III.  RESPONSES TO  
CONVERGENCE AND THE ROLE OF EXCHANGES 
A. Regulatory Responses to Convergence 
Regulators on both sides of the Atlantic have been engaged in a 
dialogue for some years concerning the possibility of convergence, 
and accommodations on both sides have been made. Yet, these 
efforts have taken on renewed significance with the increased 
consolidation among demutualized exchanges such as the recent 
merger between the NYSE and Euronext. This merger brings 
together one of the world’s oldest, largest, and most respected 
exchanges, the NYSE, with the most transnational exchange, 
Euronext, which operates exchanges in five different European 
countries.152 
Despite a trend toward convergence, the idea of shared 
standards is not always viewed positively; it can be characterized as 
overly accommodating to foreign regulatory standards.  For example, 
Annette Nazareth, SEC Director of Division of Market Regulation, 
testified before Congress concerning a proposed directive in the 
European Union: 
[The SEC] is concerned about the possible imposition of standards 
on U.S. firms by the European Community in the form of 
‘equivalence’ determinations. . . . To the extent that ‘equivalence’ is 
really a means of having a ‘coordinator’ in the E.U. evaluate the 
quality of our regulatory regime, we do not think that approach will 
be productive or add to investor protection.153 
 
 152. See Euronext, http://www.euronext.com/editorial/wide/editorial-1994-EN.html (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2008); Euronext, http://www.euronext.com/editorial/wide/editorial-1612-EN.html 
(last visited Jan. 22, 2008). 
 153. Annette L. Nazareth, Dir., Div. of Market Regulation, Sec. and Exch. Comm., 
Testimony Concerning Pending Proposals by the European Commission (May 22, 2002), 
available at www.sec.gov/news/testimony/052202tsaln.htm. 
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Her comment highlights the interest regulators have in maintaining 
sovereign control and preventing domestic standards from being 
subjected to the evaluative authority of a foreign agency.154  Given this 
interest, it is in some measure inevitable that E.U. and U.S. regulators 
base their decision-making on domestic rather than international 
factors.155  Regulators quite naturally appear unwilling to cede their 
delegated authority without strong policy reasons, which is a reason 
neither full harmonization nor complete competition are likely.  
Disagreements in regulatory approaches can arise for a number of 
reasons, since “nations are no different than commentators in 
disagreeing widely as to just what policy consideration is to be 
served . . . [and] how best to fulfill a policy objective.”156  Further, 
when considering multi-jurisdictional securities transactions that 
implicate conflicting regulatory demands, there arises the 
fundamental issue of whether such transactions should be governed 
by public or private law.157  When evaluating the prospect of 
convergence, this issue is likely to remain a principal consideration 
that can introduce a basic, and perhaps even irreconcilable, tension 
between different regulatory approaches.  This tension comes sharply 
into focus as the capital markets continue to pull international 
securities law in the direction of convergence. 
B. Exchange Activity Pushes Regulators Toward Convergence 
The merger between NYSE and Euronext will not dramatically 
change the current, territorially-focused regulatory environment.  As 
noted in the SEC’s approval of NYSE rule changes associated with 
the merger, “[a] core aspect of the structure of the Combination is 
local regulation of the marketplace, members, and issuers.  Therefore, 
securities exchanges, members, and issuers of NYSE Group and 
Euronext will continue to be regulated in the same manner as they 
are currently regulated.”158  The SEC and the College of Euronext 
Regulators (regulators from each of the five countries in which 
Euronext operates an exchange) signed a Memorandum of 
 
 154. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 155. See Karmel, supra note 97, at 379. 
 156. Cox, supra note 51, at 1180-81. 
 157. Id. at 1181. 
 158. Order Granting Approval of Proposed Rule Change and Notice of Filing and Order 
Granting Accelerated Approval to Amendment No. 1 Regarding the Proposed Combination 
Between NYSE Group, Inc. and Euronext N.V., Exchange Act Release No. 34-55293, 72 Fed. 
Reg. 35,8033, 35,8035 (Feb. 22, 2007). 
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Understanding on January 25, 2007, in which they affirmed the 
importance of keeping the markets locally regulated.159  Yet the 
increased cooperation via this regulatory Memorandum is directly 
connected to the NYSE’s and Euronext’s merger.  Significantly, a 
large part of the Memorandum was committed to ongoing 
cooperation and dialogue.160  Each regulator stated that, to the extent 
practicable, it would keep the other informed of regulatory changes 
or material events that would have an impact on NYSE-Euronext, 
including enforcement actions that could adversely impact the 
exchange or any other market in another regulator’s jurisdiction.161  
While Memoranda of Understanding between regulators concerning 
enforcement are not new,162 exchanges, in their new roles as 
demutualized organizations, are necessitating even closer regulatory 
dialogue beyond solely enforcement.  The NYSE-Euronext 
Memorandum extends to keeping each other informed of regulatory 
changes or material events.  Such increased communication will 
facilitate incremental movements toward convergence in other areas 
such as accounting and disclosure requirements. 
Presently, the activity in capital markets and among regulators 
seems to be a validation of Professor John Coffee’s argument that 
exchanges play a role in creating convergence because they create a 
“bonding mechanism” when an issuer lists on an exchange.163  For 
example, foreign issuers enter into listing agreements with the NYSE 
before listing their stock.  By entering into this agreement, a foreign 
issuer agrees to be bound by those regulatory standards that it may 
not be subject to under its home jurisdiction.164  Listing on an 
exchange represents a voluntary agreement by foreign issuers to be 
subjected to a host country’s corporate and securities laws, and these 
“bonding” agreements between exchanges and issuers are a 
significant factor in creating converged standards.165  One argument 
 
 159. Memorandum of Understanding, Sec. Exch. Comm. and College of Euronext 
Regulators, arts. 2, 13 (Jan. 25, 2007). 
 160. Id. arts. 2, 6. 
 161. Id. arts. 3, 16. 
 162. LOUIS LOSS AND JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 5241 (3d. ed. 2005). 
 163. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in 
Corporate Governance and its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 674, 691-92 (1999). 
 164. Id. at 691. 
 165. See id. at 652-53.  Professor Coffee also distinguishes between “functional 
convergence” and “formal convergence,” and appears to categorize the “bonding mechanism” 
of exchange listings as a type of functional convergence.  See id. at 650, 679-82.  For analyses of 
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against this possibility is that self-regulatory organizations (SROs), 
while standard-setters, are not able to pre-empt the laws of the 
overseeing government regulatory body, such as the SEC.166  
However, the SEC and the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions have a history of respecting the self-regulatory role that 
exchanges play in the capital markets.167  The SEC has previously 
stated that “[e]nhancing an SRO’s ability to implement and to 
respond quickly to changes in the marketplace should encourage 
innovation and better services. . . . Investors should also benefit from 
a competitive environment in which SROs may easily adapt their 
trading rules to respond to market opportunities.”168  There has been 
a long history favoring self-regulation in the U.S. markets.  The SEC 
has acknowledged that, in creating the self-regulatory structure of 
American securities markets, “Congress determined that the 
securities industry self-regulatory system would provide a workable 
balance between federal and industry regulation.”169  Moreover, 
exchanges themselves are an interest group.  Now that they are 
operating as demutualized entities with shareholders, they will be 
facing pressure from new constituencies to sustain and increase their 
profitability.170  Thus, exchanges have an arguably greater interest 
now that they are demutualized in pushing for the convergence of 
regulatory standards.  As both interest groups and standard-setters, 
exchanges are increasingly influencing the regulatory landscape going 
forward, albeit on an incremental and indirect level. 
CONCLUSION 
The international landscape of securities law has been 
undergoing significant changes for several years, as capital markets 
 
specific corporate governance dynamics that might incentivize a company to list on a foreign 
exchange, see id. at 680-83. 
 166. Shirinyan, supra note 1, at 529. 
 167. See SRO Consultative Comm., Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns, Model for Effective 
Regulation 1, 4 (May 2000), available at http://www.iosco.org/download/pdf/2000-effective_self-
regulation.pdf (“In an environment characterized by a variety of different markets and different 
types of participants, a specialized and thorough knowledge is very beneficial.”). 
 168. Rule Changes of Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-43860, 
66 Fed. Reg. 8,912 (proposed Feb. 5, 2001). 
 169. Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 34-507000, 
69 Fed. Reg. 71,256 (proposed Dec. 8, 2004) (citing S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); 
H.R. Doc. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934)). 
 170. For a view of the NYSE as acting as an “interest group pressuring the SEC to relax its 
disclosure standards,” see Karmel, supra note 32, at 487. 
03__HARVEY.DOC 5/27/2008  1:28:26 PM 
2007] EXCHANGE CONSOLIDATION 179 
become increasingly interconnected and global.  This movement 
appears to have accelerated recently with the development of 
demutualized exchanges, leading to international consolidations and 
alliances among exchanges.  Going forward, the possibility of 
international convergence of securities regulations, will largely evolve 
based on how exchanges, as businesses, navigate the regulatory 
waters surrounding cross-border combinations, and how, as self-
regulatory organizations, they promulgate standards for issuers and 
investors.  Regulatory dialogue and approval is necessary and helpful, 
yet the current activities of the exchanges themselves are strong 
catalysts in the convergence of particular standards, such as those 
governing accounting and disclosure. 
